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Abstract
In this work we present secure two-party protocols for various core problems in linear algebra. Our
main building block is a protocol to obliviously decide singularity of an encrypted matrix: Bob holds an
n × n matrix M , encrypted with Alice’s secret key, and wants to learn whether the matrix is singular
or not (and nothing beyond that). We give an interactive protocol between Alice and Bob that solves
the above problem with optimal communication complexity while at the same time achieving low round
complexity. More precisely, the number of communication rounds in our protocol is polylog(n) and the
overall communication is roughly O(n2) (note that the input size is n2). At the core of our protocol
we exploit some nice mathematical properties of linearly recurrent sequences and their relation to the
characteristic polynomial of the matrix M , following [Wiedemann, 1986]. With our new techniques
we are able to improve the round complexity of the communication efficient solution of [Nissim and
Weinreb, 2006] from n0.275 to polylog(n).
Based on our singularity protocol we further extend our result to the problems of securely computing
the rank of an encrypted matrix and solving systems of linear equations.
Key words. Secure Linear Algebra, Linearly Recurrent Sequences, Wiedemann’s Algorithm.
1 Introduction
Linear algebra plays a central role in computer science in general and in cryptography in particular. Nu-
merous cryptographic applications such as private information retrieval, secret sharing schemes, multi-party
secure computation, and many more make use of linear algebra. In particular, the ability to efficiently
solve a set of linear equations constitutes an important algorithmic and cryptographic tool. In this work we
design efficient and secure protocols for various linear algebraic problems. Our protocols enjoy both low
communication and round complexity.
We concentrate on the following problem. Alice holds the private key of a public-key homomorphic
encryption system, and Bob holds a square matrix M , encrypted by Alice’s public key. Alice and Bob wish
to decide whether M is singular while leaking no other information on M . Many linear algebraic tasks
are efficiently reducible to this problem. Our protocol is based on an algorithm by Wiedemann for “black-
box linear algebra” [24] which is highly efficient when applied to sparse matrices. This algorithm uses
linearly recurrent sequences and their relation to the greatest common divisor problem for polynomials (see
Section 3). Somehow surprisingly, we design a secure protocol based on this algorithm which is applicable
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to general matrices. Previous secure protocols for linear algebraic problems were based on basic linear
algebra techniques like Gaussian Elimination. Our protocols exploit more advanced properties of linear
systems, and thus achieve improved complexity bounds.
Cramer and Damga˚rd initiated the study of secure protocols for solving various linear algebraic prob-
lems [7]. Their work was done in the information theoretical multi-party setup, with the main focus on
reducing the protocols’ round complexity to a constant. The communication complexity of their protocols
is Ω(n3) while the size of the inputs is merely O(n2). Another known approach for designing secure pro-
tocols for the mentioned linear algebraic problems is to apply the garbled circuit method of Yao [25]. The
communication complexity of such protocols is related to the Boolean circuit complexity of the underlying
problems. However, as these problems are strongly related to the problem of matrix multiplication [5], the
communication complexity of the resulting protocol is essentially the circuit complexity of the latter. The
best known upper bound for this problem is O(nω) [6] for ω ∼= 2.38, which is still larger than the input
size. In a recent paper, Nissim and Weinreb [19] introduced a protocol with communication complexity1
of roughly O(n2). However, their protocol, which relies on the Gaussian elimination procedure, has round
complexity Ω(n0.275), which is considered relatively high.
We design a protocol for deciding singularity which gets the best of previous results, both in terms of
communication and round complexity, up to a poly-logarithmic factor. We achieve communication com-
plexity of roughly O(n2) and polylog(n) round complexity, assuming (similar to [19]) the existence of
homomorphic public-key encryption schemes. This leads to communication and round efficient protocols
for many linear algebraic problems. For example, consider the linear subspace intersection problem, in
which each of Alice and Bob holds a subspace of Fn and they wish to securely decide whether there is a
non-zero vector in the intersection of their input subspaces. Even for insecure computation, it is shown in [2]
that the deterministic communication complexity of the problem is Ω(n2). This result agrees with ours up
to a poly-logarithmic factor.2 Hence, our secure protocol for this problem is optimal up to poly-logarithmic
factor, both in terms of communication and round complexity. Our protocols also give rise to communica-
tion and round efficient secure protocols for problems reducible to linear algebra, e.g., perfect matching, and
functions with low span program complexity [16].
Our Techniques. A simple reduction turns the problem of deciding if an encrypted input matrix M is
singular, into deciding whether a system Mx = v is solvable for a randomly chosen vector v. The main
technical tool we use for our protocols are linearly recurrent sequences. In a linear system Mx = v, where
M is an n × n matrix and v is a vector, the vectors v,Mv,M2v, . . . ,M2nv are clearly linearly depen-
dent. Roughly speaking, the scalars of this linear dependency are related to the characteristic and minimal
polynomials of the matrix M . It turns out that computing a polynomial called the minimal polynomial of
the sequence v,Mv,M2v, . . . ,M2nv is sufficient for deciding the solvability of the original linear system.
This polynomial, in turn, can be computed from v,Mv,M2v, . . . ,M2nv using the extended Euclidean
algorithm for GCD of polynomials.
In our protocol Bob holds Enc(M) and v, where Enc(·) is a public-key homomorphic encryption
scheme, and Alice holds the private decryption key. In the first step, Bob needs to compute Enc(v),
Enc(Mv), Enc(M2v), . . ., Enc(M2nv). The homomorphic encryption scheme does not allow for multipli-
cation of encrypted values and thus Bob needs the “help” of Alice to perform the computations. However,
he cannot disclose the values of M or v to her. We give a method to securely compute Enc(v), Enc(Mv),
1We omit polylogarithmic factor from the complexity bounds discussed in the introduction.
2Although determining the randomized communication complexity of subspace intersection is an open problem, it serves as an
evidence that our upper bound may be tight.
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Enc(M2v), . . ., Enc(M2nv) within 2 log n rounds of communication. To securely compute the minimal
polynomial of the encrypted sequence using the extended Euclidean algorithm, we apply the well-known
general result by Yao [25], allowing for secure computation of a function with communication complexity
proportional to the Boolean circuit complexity of the computed function. We show a general method to
apply the construction of Yao, from a starting point where Bob holds an encrypted input and Alice holds the
decryption key. We stress that trying to apply Yao’s construction on the original linear algebraic problem
would result in an Ω(nω) communication protocol.
The above mentioned protocol enables deciding whether a linear system is solvable. In order to actually
find a random solution to the system Mx = y, given encryptions of M and y, we apply an algorithm by
Kaltofen and Saunders [15]. The technical difficulty in applying this algorithm is that it depends on the rank
of the matrix M . Computing the rank of M in the clear would compromise the privacy of the protocol. We
overcome this problem by designing a protocol for computing an encryption of the rank of an encrypted
matrix. As the rank of a matrix is a basic concept in linear algebra, this protocol may be of independent
interest. We use the fact that multiplying a rank r matrix from the right and from the left by non-singular
matrices perturbs the matrix in a way that with high probability the top-left r×r sub-matrix of the perturbed
matrix is non-singular [4]. The rank is computed then using oblivious binary search. We then show how to
implement a secure version of the Kaltofen-Saunders algorithm using only an encrypted form of the rank of
M .
Organization. In Section 2 we discuss the setting and some basic building blocks. In Section 3 we define
linearly recurrent sequences and discuss their basic properties. Then, in Section 4, we introduce our main
protocol for deciding singularity of an encrypted matrix. In Section 6, we design a protocol for solving
an encrypted linear system, based on a protocol for computing the rank of a matrix, which is presented in
Section 5. Then, in Section 7, we present an implementation of our basic sub-protocols using the garbled
circuit method of Yao, and finally, in Section 8, we demonstrate some applications of our secure protocols.
2 General Framework
Notation. Let F be a finite field with p elements, and denote k = log p. For an encryption scheme, we
denote by λ its security parameter. W.l.o.g., we assume that the result of encrypting a field element is of
length O(λ + k) = O(λ). We denote by neg(n) a function that is negligible in n, i.e., neg(n) = n−ω(1).
We view a vector v ∈ Fn as a column vector. To denote a row vector we use v>. Finally, we use the O˜(·)
notation to hide any poly-logarithmic factors, that is, O˜(f(n)) = O(f(n)polylog(n)).
Homomorphic encryption schemes. Our constructions use semantically-secure public-key encryption
schemes that allow for simple computations on encrypted data. In particular, we use encryption schemes
where the following operations can be performed without knowledge of the private key: (i) Given two en-
cryptions Enc(m1) and Enc(m2), we can efficiently compute a random encryption Enc(m1 + m2); and
(ii) Given an encryption Enc(m) and c ∈ F, we can efficiently compute a random encryption Enc(cm).
Several constructions of homomorphic encryption schemes are known, each with its particular properties
(see e.g. [22, 14, 11, 21, 23, 20, 3, 18, 8]). These have been in use in a variety of cryptographic protocols.
Over F = GF(2), for example, the encryption scheme of Goldwasser and Micali [14], based on quadratic
residuosity, is sufficient for our constructions.
For a vector v ∈ Fn, we denote by Enc(v) the coordinate-wise encryption of v. That is, if v =
〈a1, . . . , an〉 where a1, . . . , an ∈ F, then Enc(v) = 〈Enc(a1), . . . ,Enc(an)〉. Similarly, for a matrix M ∈
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F
m×n
, we denote by Enc(M) the m × n matrix such that Enc(M)[i, j] = Enc(M [i, j]). An immediate
consequence of the above properties of homomorphic encryption schemes is the ability to perform the
following operations without knowledge of the secret key: (i) Given encryptions of two vectors Enc(v1) and
Enc(v2), we can efficiently compute Enc(v1 + v2), and similarly with matrices. (ii) Given an encryption
of a vector Enc(v) and a constant c ∈ F, we can efficiently compute Enc(cv). (iii) Given an encryption of
a matrix Enc(M) and a matrix M ′ of the appropriate dimensions, we can efficiently compute Enc(MM ′)
and Enc(M ′M), as any entry in the result matrix is a linear combination of some encrypted matrix entries.
In some cases we want to use the encryption scheme Enc to encrypt an integer ` where 0 ≤ ` ≤ n. We
do this by encrypting the binary representation of `, bit by bit. If ` =
∑logn
i=0 `i2
i
, where `i ∈ {0, 1} for
every 0 ≤ i ≤ log n, then we use the notation Encbin(`) = (Enc(`logn), . . . ,Enc(`1),Enc(`0)).
Adversary model. Our protocols are constructed for the two-party semi-honest adversary model. Roughly
speaking, both parties are assumed to act in accordance with their prescribed actions in the protocol. Each
party may, however, collect any information he/she encounters during the protocol run, and try to gain
some information about the other party’s input. We will compose our protocols in a modular manner and
will argue about their privacy using well-known sequential composition theorems [13] in the semi-honest
adversary model.
Complexity Measures. Any interaction between Alice and Bob in the protocol is called a round of com-
munication. The total number of such interactions consists the round complexity of the protocol. In each
round some data is sent from Bob to Alice or from Alice to Bob. The size of all the data (i.e. the total
number of bits) that is communicated between Alice and Bob during the whole execution of the protocol is
called the communication complexity of the protocol. We make the convention to count the communication
complexity of our protocols in terms of multiples of λ, i.e. we count the number of encrypted values Enc(·)
exchanged between Alice and Bob.
2.1 Useful Sub-Protocols
In our protocols Bob holds data encrypted by a public key homomorphic encryption scheme, while Alice
holds the private decryption key. We view our protocols as algorithms Bob executes on his encrypted
input. As mentioned above, the homomorphic encryption allows Bob to locally perform several simple
manipulations on his input. However, some operation require the help of Alice. In Table 1, we list a set
of operations Bob can perform using the help of Alice. These operations determine the communication
and round complexity of our protocols, and thus we added the complexities of each sub-protocol to the
table. Later, in Section 7, we show how to implement these sub-protocols within the mentioned complexity
bounds, enabling Bob to use Alice’s help to perform the described operations without disclosing any of his
data to her.
As an example of a protocol where Bob uses Alice’s help, we now present Protocol MATRIX MULT
for encrypted matrix multiplication. Bob holds the encryptions Enc(A) and Enc(B) of two matrices A ∈
F
n×` and B ∈ F`×m. Alice holds the private decryption key. In the end of the protocol Bobs should
hold the encryption Enc(AB) of the product matrix AB ∈ Fn×m. Bob chooses two random matrices
RA ∈ Fn×` and RB ∈ F`×m and sends Alice the two matrices Enc(A + RA) and Enc(B + RB), which
can be locally computed using the homomorphic properties of Enc(·). Alice decrypts these matrices and
returns Enc((A+RA) · (B+RB)) to Bob. Finally Bob locally computes Enc(AB) = Enc((A+RA)(B+
RB))− Enc(ARB)− Enc(RAB)− Enc(RARB). The protocol runs in two rounds and the communication
complexity of this protocol is n`+ `m+ nm. The security proof for this protocol is straightforward.
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Protocol name INPUT/OUTPUT Communication Rounds
complexity
MATRIX MULT Input: Enc(A),Enc(B) (A ∈ Fn×`, B ∈ F`×m) `n+ `m+ nm 2
Output Enc(A ·B)
NONZERO Input: Enc(x) (x ∈ F) O(k) 2
Output: Enc(1) if x 6= 0, Enc(0) if x = 0
EQUAL Input: Encbin(x), Encbin(y) (0 ≤ x, y ≤ n) O(k) O(1)
Output: Enc(1) if x = y, Enc(0) if x 6= y
UNARY Input: Encbin(r) (0 ≤ r ≤ n) O(kn) O(1)
Output: Enc(δ), δ ∈ Fn, δi = 1 if r ≥ i, δi = 0 otherwise.
Table 1: Basic sub-protocols and their complexities.
3 Linearly Recurrent Sequences
We reduce the problem of deciding if a linear system Mx = v is solvable, to computing the minimal
polynomial of a certain linearly recurrent sequence. In this section we formally define linearly recurrent
sequences and discuss some of their basic properties. We follow the exposition given in [12].
Let F be field and V be a vector space over F. An infinite sequence a = (ai)i∈N ∈ V N is linearly
recurrent (over F) if there exists n ∈ N and f0, . . . , fn ∈ F with fn 6= 0 such that ∑nj=0 fjai+j = 0 , for
all i ∈ N. The polynomial f =∑nj=0 fjxj of degree n is called a characteristic polynomial of a.
We now define a multiplication of a sequence by a polynomial. For f =
∑n
j=0 fjx
j ∈ F[x] and
a = (ai)i∈N ∈ V N, we set
f • a = (
n∑
j=0
fjai+j)i∈N ∈ V N.
This makes FN, together with •, into an F[x]-module.3
The property of being a characteristic polynomial can be expressed in terms of the operation •. A
polynomial f ∈ F[x]\ {0} is a characteristic polynomial of a ∈ FN if and only if f • a = 0 where 0 is
the all-0 sequence. The set of all characteristic polynomials of a sequence a ∈ FN, together with the zero
polynomial form an ideal in F[x]. This ideal is called the annihilator of a and denoted by Ann(a). Since
any ideal in F[x] is generated by a single polynomial, either Ann(a) = {0} or there is a unique monic
polynomial m ∈ Ann(a) of least degree such that 〈m〉 = {rm : r ∈ F[x]} = Ann(a). This polynomial
is called the minimal polynomial of a and divides any other characteristic polynomial of a. We denote the
minimal polynomial of a by ma. The degree of ma is called the recursion order of a.
Let M ∈ Fn×n be a matrix, and u,v ∈ Fn be vectors. We will be interested in the following three
sequences: (i) A = (M i)i∈N where the sequence elements are from V = Fn×n. (ii) a = (M iv)i∈N where
the sequence elements are from V = Fn. (iii) a′ = (u>M iv)i∈N where the sequence elements are from
V = F. We denote by fM = det(M − xIn) =∑ni=1 fjxj , the characteristic polynomial of M .
Claim 3.1 Consider ma′ ,ma,mA, the minimal polynomials of the sequences a′,a,A respectively. Then
ma′ |ma|mA|fM .
3Roughly speaking, a module is something similar to a vector space, with the only difference that the “scalars” may be elements
of an arbitrary ring instead of a field. See any linear algebra textbook for a formal definition.
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Proof: We first show mA|fM . By the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem fM (M) = 0. Consequently,
fM •A = (
n∑
j=0
fjM
i+j)i∈N = (M ifM (M))i∈N = 0,
and fM (M) is a characteristic polynomial of A. Therefore mA, the minimal polynomial of A, divides fM .
Next, to prove ma|mA, write mA =∑ni=0 aixi. As mA •A = 0, we get that (∑nj=0 ajM i+j)i∈N = 0.
Hence,
mA • a = (
n∑
j=0
aj(M i+j · v))i∈N = ((
n∑
j=0
ajM
i+j ·)v)i∈N = (0 · v)i∈N = 0.
Therefore mA is a characteristic polynomial of a as well, and this ma|mA. The proof of ma′ |ma is similar.
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Corollary 3.2 The sequences a,a′,A are linearly recurrent of order at most n.
4 Deciding Matrix Singularity
In this section we consider the following problem: Bob holds an n × n dimensional matrix Enc(M) over
a finite field F, encrypted under a public-key homomorphic encryption scheme. Alice holds the private
decryption key, and they wish to decide whether M is singular, or equivalently, whether det(M) = 0. As
mentioned in Section 2, we view the protocol as an algorithm executed by Bob, in which some operations
require the help of Alice. The implementation of the secure sub-protocols for these operations is presented
in Section 7. Our protocol is based on an algorithm by Wiedemann for “black-box linear algebra” [24].
As a simple first step, we reduce the problem into checking if a certain random linear system is solvable.
A second reduction leads us to the problem of computing the minimal polynomial of a linearly recurrent
sequence. We then show how to securely compute this particular sequence, and finally, how to compute its
minimal polynomial to solve the original matrix singularity problem.
Our first step is to reduce the problem of deciding whether det(M) = 0 to deciding whether the linear
system Ax = v is solvable for some random vector v ∈ Fn. If M is non-singular then, obviously, the linear
system must be solvable. On the other hand, if det(M) = 0, then with probability at least 1/ |F| ≥ 1/2,
the linear system has no solution. Thus, repeating this experiment ω(log n) solves the original problem with
overwhelming success probability.
Next, we reduce the problem of deciding whether the linear system Ax = v is solvable to computing
ma, the minimum polynomial of the recurrent sequence of vectors a = (M iv)i∈N.
Claim 4.1 ([12]) (i) If ma(0) 6= 0 then the system Ax = v is solvable. (ii) If ma(0) = 0 then det(M) = 0.
Proof: (i) Since by Claim 3.2 the order of a is at most n, we can write ma =
∑n
i=0mix
i
. As ma is the
minimal polynomial of a, we get that
mnM
nv +mn−1Mn−1v + . . .+m1Mv +m0Iv = 0.
Since m0 = ma(0) is different to 0, we get
−m−10 (mnMnv +mn−1Mn−1v + . . .+m1Mv) = v
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and hence
M(−m−10 (mnMn−1v +mn−1Mn−2v + . . .+m1Iv)) = v.
Therefore, the system Mx = v is solvable.
(ii) Let fM be the characteristic polynomial of M . By Claim 3.1, it holds that ma|fM . Since ma(0) = 0
we get that x|ma and thus x|fM . Therefore, the constant coefficient of fM is 0. As the constant coefficient
of the characteristic polynomial fM is −det(M), we get that det(M) = 0. 2
We are interested in finding the minimal polynomial of a linearly recurrent sequence of vectors a =
(M iv)i∈N. This is done by picking a random vector u ∈ Fn and further reducing the problem to computing
the minimal polynomial of the linearly recurrent sequence of field elements a′ = (u>M iv)i∈N. The
correctness of the reduction is proved in Lemma 12.17. in [12]. In particular, it is proved that for fields
of size at least 2n, the minimal polynomials of a and a′ are equal, with at least a constant probability.
Lemma 4.2 ([12]) LetM ∈ Fn×n, v ∈ Fn,ma be the minimal polynomial of the sequence a = (M iv)i∈N.
Then the probability p that ma is the minimal polynomial of the sequence a′ = (u>M iv)i∈N for a u ∈ Fn
chosen uniformly at random satisfies p ≥ 1− deg(ma)/|F|.
To compute ma′ , the minimal polynomial of the sequence a′, we first need to compute a prefix of the
sequence itself. As we will later see, the 2n first entries of the sequence will suffice. As the communication
complexity of the sub-protocol for matrix multiplication is linear in the matrix size, we are interested in
computing (Enc(u>M iv))0≤i≤2n−1 using the least number of matrix multiplication operations. We next
show how to compute the sequence using 2 log n+ 1 matrix multiplication operations.
First compute Enc(M2j ) for 0 ≤ j ≤ log n. This can be easily done in log n sequential matrix mul-
tiplications. For two matrices X and Y of matching size let X|Y be the matrix obtained by concatenating
X with Y . Then compute the following using sequential log n matrix multiplications: (Note that all the
matrices are of dimensions at most n× n.)
Enc(Mv) = Enc(M)v
Enc(M3v|M2v) = Enc(M2) · Enc(Mv|v)
Enc(M7v|M6v|M5v|M4v) = Enc(M4) · Enc(M3v|M2v|Mv|v)
.
.
. =
.
.
.
Enc(M2n−1v|M2n−2v| . . . |Mnv) = Enc(Mn) · Enc(Mn−1v|Mn−2v| . . . |v)
Finally, multiply each vector Enc(M iv) from the left by u> to get Enc(u>M iv) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n− 1.
Our next step is to compute the minimal polynomial. By Corollary 3.2, the order of the sequence a′ is at
most n. To compute the minimal polynomial of the sequence a′ given the encryption of its first 2n elements,
we use the sub-protocol MINPOLY. The protocol is based on the well-known general construction by
Yao [25], which supplies a constant round secure protocol for a function f , with communication complexity
that is linear in the size of the boolean circuit implementing f . Since the circuit size of the well-known
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [17] for computing the minimal polynomial is O(n2k log k) we get a sub-
protocol with O˜(n2k) communication complexity and constant rounds. A constant round implementation
of the sub-protocol MINPOLY with O˜(nk) communication complexity appears in Section 7.
To summarize, Protocol SINGULAR decides if a given encrypted square matrix is singular. To get a
constant success probability in each iteration of the protocol, we need |F| to be at least 2n. In case |F| < 2n,
we work over an extension field, which costs a logarithmic factor in the communication complexity4.
4It is not hard to derive a homomorphic encryption scheme over an extension field ofF given a homomorphic encryption scheme
over F.
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Protocol SINGULAR
Input: Enc(M) where M ∈ Fn×n
Output: Enc(0) if det(M) = 0 and Enc(1) otherwise.
Repeat the following ω(log n) times:
1. Pick random vectors u,v ∈R Fn.
For i = 0 . . . 2n − 1 compute the values a′i = Enc(u>M iv) using 2 log n executions of the
matrix multiplication protocol.
2. Execute Protocol MINPOLY to compute Enc(ma′), an encryption of the minimal polynomial
of the sequence a′ = (a′i)0≤i≤2n−1.
3. Execute Protocol NONZERO on Enc(ma′(0)).
Compute the logical AND of the ω(log n) results and answer accordingly.
The following theorem summarizes the properties of Protocol SINGULAR. Due to lack of space, the
proof is moved to Appendix A.3.
Theorem 4.3 Let Enc(M) be an encrypted n×n matrix over a finite fieldF, such that |F| ≥ 2n. Then Pro-
tocol SINGULAR securely checks if M is singular with probability 1−neg(n), communication complexity
O˜(n2k) and round complexity polylog(n), where k = log |F|.
5 Computing the Rank
In this section we show how to compute Encbin(rank(M)) given an encryption Enc(M) of a matrix M ∈
F
m×n
. That is, if r = rank(M), we are interested in outputting Encbin(r). We compute the encryption of
the binary representation of r bit by bit. We first show ProtocolRANK≥ that decides whether rank(M) ≥ `
given a bit-wise encryption of a positive integer `.
Protocol RANK≥
Input: Enc(M) where M ∈ Fm×n, for n ≤ m and Encbin(`) where 1 ≤ ` ≤ n. a
Output: Enc(1) if rank(M) ≥ ` and Enc(0) otherwise.
Perform the following ω(log n) times:
1. Locally compute Enc(M ′) = P · Enc(M) ·Q where P and Q are random non-singular m ×m
and n× n matrices respectively.
2. Compute Enc(δ) (with δi = 1 if ` ≥ i and δi = 0 otherwise) from Encbin(`) using the UNARY
protocol. Create Enc(∆), where ∆ is the n × n diagonal matrix ∆ = diag(δ1, δ2, . . . , δn).
Compute
Enc(M ′`) = Enc(M
′) · Enc(∆) + In − Enc(∆),
where In is the n × n identity matrix. Note that M ′` ∈ Fn×n is now the matrix that coincides
with M ′ in the top-left `× ` sub-matrix and with the unit matrix in the n− `×n− ` bottom-right
sub-matrix.
3. Execute Protocol SINGULAR on M ′` and output accordingly.
Compute and output the logical OR of the results of the ω(log n) iterations.
ain m < n execute the protocol on Enc(M>).
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The protocol relies on the following simple linear algebraic claim.
Claim 5.1 ([4]) Let n ≤ m be positive integers, F be a finite field, and M be a m × n matrix over F.
Suppose r ≤ rank(M) and let P and Q be m×m and n× n randomly chosen full rank matrices over F.
Let M ′ = PMQ, and denote the top-left r × r sub-matrix of M ′ by N ′. Then with constant probability
rank(N ′) = r.
The proof of the next claim is moved to appendix A.1 due to lack of space.
Claim 5.2 Protocol RANK≥ securely computes whether rank(M) ≥ ` with probability 1− neg(n), com-
munication complexity O˜(n2k) and round complexity polylog(n).
Next, in Protocol RANK, we perform log n executions of Protocol RANK≥, to compute the encryption
of the rank of M using a binary search. The protocol starts with ` = 2blognc and checks if the rank of M
is greater or equal to `. In the first case the most significant bit of M ’s rank, r`, is set to 1 and the check
is repeated with the new value ` = 2blognc + 2blognc−1 to determine the second most significant bit of the
rank. In the latter case the the most significant bit of M ’s rank, r`, is set to 0 and the check is repeated with
the new value ` = 2blognc−1. This is repeated until all bits of the rank are determined. Note that the search
is performed obliviously, as the threshold rank given to Protocol RANK≥ is encrypted. The full description
of protocol RANK and is given in Appendix A.1, together with the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.3 Let Enc(M) be an encrypted m × n matrix over a finite field F. Protocol RANK securely
computes Encbin(rank(M)) with probability 1 − neg(n), communication complexity O˜(n2k) and round
complexity polylog(n), where k = log |F|.
6 Solving Linear Equations
In this section we discuss the problem of solving a system of linear equations. Given encryptions Enc(M)
and Enc(y), representing the linear system Mx = y, where M ∈ Fm×n and y ∈ Fm, we are interested in
outputting an encryption Enc(x) of a random solution to the system, if the system is solvable. We present a
protocol that relies on Protocol SINGULAR.
The easy case to deal with is where M is a non-singular square matrix. In this case it is enough to
compute Enc(M−1) and then execute Protocol MATRIX MULT once to compute Enc(M−1)Enc(y) =
Enc(M−1y), which is the unique solution to the system (and hence is also a random solution). To compute
Enc(M−1) from Enc(M) we use Protocol MATRIX INVERT. The protocol gets an encrypted n × n
matrix Enc(M) as input, and outputs an encryption of a matrix and an encryption of a field element. If
M is invertible, the protocol outputs Enc(M−1),Enc(1). Otherwise, it outputs Enc(R−1),Enc(0), where
R is a random non-singular n × n matrix. The protocol uses Protocol SINGULAR as a sub-protocol. Its
implementation is simple and is described in Appendix A.2.
To reduce the general case to the non-singular case we will show how to apply an algorithm by Kaltofen
and Saunders [15] in the secure setting. The algorithm solves Mx = y in the following way: (i) Perturb
the linear system Mx = y to get a system M ′x = y′ with the same solution space. The perturbation has
the property that, with high probability, if M is of rank r, then M ′r×r, the top-left r × r sub-matrix of M ′,
is non-singular. (ii) Pick a random vector u ∈ Fn and set y′r to be the upper r coordinates of the vector
y′ +M ′u. (iii) Solve the linear system M ′r×rxr = y′r, and denote the solution by ur. (iv) Let u∗ ∈ Fn be
a vector whose upper part is ur and its lower part is zero. It can be shown that x = u∗ − u is a uniform
random solution to the system M ′x = y′ and thus is a uniform random solution to the original system. The
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correctness proof for this algorithm may be found in [15, Theorem 4]. Note that this algorithm is correct
assuming that the system Mx = y is solvable.
Implementing the above algorithm in a secure protocol is not straightforward. On one hand, we need to
compute r, the rank of M , in order to invert the top-left sub-matrix of M . On the other hand, computing r
violates the privacy of the protocol, as r cannot be extracted from a random solution to the linear system.
We overcome this problem using Protocol RANK from Section 5, to compute an encryption of r.
Next, we show how to implement the Kaltofen-Saunders algorithm having only an encryption of r =
rank(M). The key idea is that we can work with the r × r top-left sub-matrix of the perturbed matrix M ′,
without knowing the value of r in the clear.
Protocol LINEAR SOLVE
Input: Enc(M) where M ∈ Fm×n and n ≤ m, and Enc(y) where y ∈ Fm. This protocol assumes the
system Mx = y is solvable.
Output: Enc(x) where x ∈ Fn is a random solution to the system Mx = y.
1. Execute Protocol RANK on Enc(M) to compute Enc(r) where r = rank(M).
2. Repeat the following ω(log n) times:
(a) Locally compute Enc(M ′) = P · Enc(M) ·Q and Enc(y′) = P · Enc(y) where P and Q
are random non-singular m×m and n× n matrices respectively.
(b) Compute the encrypted matrix Enc(M ′r) as in Step 2 of Protocol RANK≥.
(c) Compute (Enc(H),Enc(b)) using protocol MATRIX INVERT, where H = (M ′r)−1 ∈
F
n×n and b = 1 if M ′r is non-singular. If M ′r is singular then b = 0, indicating that H is a
random matrix, and that this iteration of the protocol is faulty.
(d) Pick a random vector u ∈ Fn and set Enc(y′r) for y′r ∈ Fn to be a vector whose upper r
coordinates are the upper r coordinates of Enc(y′)+Enc(M ′)u and lower n−r coordinates
are Enc(0). This can be easily using the protocol UNARY.
(e) Execute the matrix multiplication protocol MATRIX MULT to compute Enc(ur) =
Enc((M ′r)
−1)Enc(y′r).
(f) Compute Enc(Q−1(u− ur)).
3. Output Enc(Q−1(u− ur)) for a round in which b = 1.
Some remarks are in place. First, note that the protocol is valid only for solvable linear system. To check
if a system is solvable, it is sufficient to compare the rank of the matrices M and M |y where | stands for
concatenation. The encryption of the rank of these matrices can be computed using Protocol RANK, while
the comparison can be done using protocol EQUAL.
Next we discuss the repetitions in Protocol LINEAR SOLVE. In Step 2a, we multiply the matrix M
from the right and from the left by random non-singular matrices to get the matrix M ′. By Claim 5.1, the top
left sub-matrix of M ′ is of rank r with constant probability. If this is the case, then the rest of the protocol
follows the Kaltofen-Saunders algorithm, and thus its correctness is implied by [15, Theorem 4 ]. If the
top-left sub-matrix of M ′ is not full rank, we get that b = 0, and the output is discarded.5 Repeating the
process ω(log n) iteration ensures success probability of 1− neg(n).
5Outputting a result vector for which b 6= 0 is simple. Keep an encrypted value c that is 1 if and only if all the values of b in
previous iterations were 0. Set the output to be Enc(c) · Enc(u − ur) after every iteration. The output of the protocol will be the
output of the first iteration in which b = 1.
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As a final note, we stress that the requirement that n ≤ m is made only for simplicity of presentation.
Otherwise, M ′r would have been of dimension min(m,n) ×min(m,n) instead of n × n, and the changes
needed in the rest of the protocol are minor. The following Theorem concludes the properties of Protocol
LINEAR SOLVE.
Theorem 6.1 Let Enc(M) be an encryptedm×nmatrix over a finite fieldF, and let Enc(y) be an encrypted
vector y ∈ Fm. Protocol LINEAR SOLVE securely computes Enc(x), where x ∈ Fn is a random
solution of Mx = y, with probability 1−neg(n), communication complexity O˜(n2k) and round complexity
polylog(n), where k = log |F|.
7 Implementation of the Sub-Protocols
In this section we will show how to implement the various sub-protocols presented in Section 2.1.
7.1 Applying Yao’s Garbled Circuit Method
In this section we show how to apply the well-known garbled circuit method of Yao [25] to implement some
of the sub-protocols described in Table 1. In our protocols Bob typically holds an input Enc(x), where x is a
vector of field elements encrypted by a public-key homomorphic encryption scheme. Alice holds the private
decryption key. We show a general way to design a constant round secure protocols for a function f , with
communication complexity proportional to the Boolean circuit complexity of f . We design the protocols
such that Alice learns no information, while Bob learns Enc(f(x)).
In Yao’s two-party protocol [25] Alice and Bob hold private binary inputs x and y, respectively, and
wish to jointly compute a functionality f(x, y), such that Alice learns f(x, y) and Bob learns nothing. Let f
be a functionality with m′ inputs and `′ outputs, which can be computes by a Boolean circuit of size G. Then
the construction of Yao results in a protocol that runs in a constant number of rounds and communication
complexity O(G+m′ + `′).6
Yao’s method can be used in our setting as follows: Suppose Bob holds an encryption Enc(x), where
x = (x1, . . . , x`) is a vector of field elements. Let g : F` → Fm be a functionality. Bob wants to securely
compute the value Enc((x)). The idea is to first mask the input x with a random vector r. Then execute
Yao’s protocol on a modified functionality f that first unmasks the input, then runs the functionality g, and
finally re-masks the output with another random vector s; Details follow.
First Bob chooses random vectors r = (r1, . . . , r`) ∈ F` and s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ Fm and sends
Enc(x+ r) to Alice. Alice decrypts to get the vector x+ r ∈ F` and converts each field element to a binary
string. Now Alice and Bob execute Yao’s protocol on the following functionality f : The input of Alice is
x+ r and the input of Bob is r, s. f first unmasks the vector x by computing the bits of (x+ r)− r. Then it
runs the functionality g on the input x and masks the output vector g(x) by adding the vector s. This vector,
g(x) + s, is given back to Alice who encrypts it and sends Enc(g(x) + s) to Bob. Now Bob who knows the
random mask s in the cleartext can reconstruct Enc(g(x)).
The privacy of the protocol is implied by the privacy of Yao’s protocol. We now compute its communi-
cation complexity in terms of C(f), the circuit complexity of the functionality f as described above. The
number of input and output bits of f is `′ = k` and m′ = km, where k = log |F|. Addition and subtraction
6Here we make the (simplifying but reasonable) assumption that the primitives used in [25] (i.e., the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
protocol and sending one garbled gate of the circuit which is usually done by sending the output of a pseudorandom bit generator)
have a communication complexity O(λ) (where λ = |Enc(·)|) for each execution.
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Protocol name INPUT OUTPUT
INTERSECTION DECIDE Alice : Subspace Va ⊆ Fn Is Va ∩ Vb = {0}?
Bob: Subspace Vb ⊆ Fn
COMMON LINEAR Alice: MA ∈ Fna×n, va ∈ Fna random x with MAx = va, MBx = vb
EQUATIONS Bob: MB ∈ Fnb×n, vb ∈ Fnb
DETERMINANT Alice: MA ∈ Fn×n det(MA +MB)
Bob: MB ∈ Fn×n
Table 2: Linear algebra protocols with O˜(n2) communication complexity and polylog(n) rounds.
can be done with a circuit of size O(k), thus for masking and unmasking we need O(k(` + m)) gates.
Therefore the overall circuit size G(f) of the functionality f is O(C(g) + k(` + m)). This leads to the
following results.
Lemma 7.1 Let g : F` → Fm be a public functionality that can be represented by a binary circuit of sizeC.
Suppose Bob holds an encrypted input vector Enc(x), where x ∈ F`. Then there exists a secure two-party
protocol that runs in constant rounds and O(C+k(m+`)) communication complexity such that Bob learns
the encrypted vector Enc(y), where y = g(x) ∈ Fm, and Alice learns no information from the protocol.
In view of Lemma 7.1, the implementation of Protocols NONZERO, EQUAL and UNARY reduces to
implementing simple boolean circuits. For lack of space, we discuss these protocols in Appendix A.4.
7.2 Minimal Polynomial
Using the well-known Berlekamp/Massey algorithm [17] there exists an algebraic circuit of size O(n2) that
computes the minimal polynomial from a sequence a = (ai)i∈N of maximal recursion order n. Further
efficiency improvement can be obtained by noting that computing the minimal polynomial can actually be
reduced to computing the greatest common division (GCD) of two polynomial of degree 2n. For complete-
ness we give further details in Appendix C. Using the fast Extended Euclidean algorithm [12, Chapter 11]
the latter one can be carried out using an algebraic circuit of size O(n log n) = O˜(n).
By implementing each algebraic operation over F with a binary circuit of size O(k log k log log k) =
O˜(k) we get a binary circuit of size O˜(nk) for computing the minimal polynomial.
Lemma 7.2 Suppose Bob holds encrypted encrypted vectors Enc(a0), . . . ,Enc(a2n−1), where a = (ai)i∈N
is a linearly recurrent sequence of order at most n. There exists a secure two-party protocol MINPOLY
that runs in constant rounds and O˜(nk) communication complexity that returns the encrypted minimal
polynomial Enc(ma) of a to Bob.
8 Applications
In previous sections we described protocols whose input was an encrypted. In this section we give com-
munication and round efficient protocols for a set of problems in linear algebra, improving upon previous
results in the two-party setting. We summarize our results in Table 2 and refer to Appendix B for the exact
problem definitions and the protocols.
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A Full Protocols
A.1 Matrix Rank
Protocol RANK
Input: Enc(M) where M ∈ Fm×n, for n ≤ m.
Output: Encbin(r) where r = rank(M).
1. For every i = blog nc down to i = 0 do:
Set Enc(ri) to be the output of Protocol RANK≥ on Enc(M) and Encbin(`), where ` =
(
∑blognc
k=i+1 rk2
k) + 2i. Note that the binary presentation of Encbin(`) can be composed from
the already computed bits of Encbin(r).
2. Output Encbin(r) = (Enc(rblognc), . . . ,Enc(r0)).
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Theorem 5.3 Let Enc(M) be an encrypted m × n matrix over a finite field F. Protocol RANK securely
computes Encbin(rank(M)) with probability 1 − neg(n), communication complexity O˜(n2k) and round
complexity polylog(n), where k = log |F|.
Proof: Protocol RANK uses log n executions of protocol RANK≥ to perform a binary search for the
rank of M . The protocol is correct if and only if all the executions of RANK≥ are correct, which happens
with probability 1− neg(n). The bounds on round and communication complexity follow by the respective
bounds on the RANK≥ protocol from Claim 5.2. 2
A.2 Matrix Inversion
Bob holds an encrypted matrix Enc(M). Alice holds the private decryption key. Based on the shared field
inversion protocol from Bar-Ilan and Beaver [1] we design a protocol with the following properties. The
protocol outputs an encryption of a matrix and an encryption of a field element. If M is invertible then in
the end of the execution Bob holds (Enc(M−1),Enc(1)) while if M is singular Bob gets (Enc(R),Enc(0))
for a random non-singular matrix R. Alice learns nothing in the protocol.
Protocol MATRIX INVERT
Input: Enc(M) where M ∈ Fn×n.
Output: (Enc(M−1),Enc(1)) if M is invertible and (Enc(R−1),Enc(0)), where R is a random non-
singular n× n matrix, if M is singular.
1. Alice and Bob execute Protocol SINGULAR on Enc(M). Denote the output of this step by
Enc(b).
2. Bob picks a random n × n non-singular encrypted matrix R. Bob uses the help of Alice to
compute the matrix Enc(M˜) = Enc(M) · Enc(b) + Enc(R) · Enc(1− b).
3. Bob picks another n× n random non-singular matrix Q.
4. Bob computes the encrypted matrix Enc(QM˜) by multiplying Enc(M˜) from the left by the ma-
trix Q, and sends Enc(QM˜) to Alice.
5. Alice decrypts Enc(QM˜) and compute (QM˜)−1 = M˜−1Q−1. Alice encrypts M˜−1Q−1 and
sends Bob Enc(M˜−1Q−1).
6. Bob computes Enc(M˜−1) = Enc(M˜−1Q−1)Q.
7. Bob locally outputs Enc(M˜−1),Enc(b).
It is easy to see that the matrix M˜ is always invertible. In case M is invertible M˜ = M , otherwise M˜
is a random non-singular matrix. In both cases, Alice gets a random non-singular matrix QM˜ , and thus
learns no information in the protocol. In case M is invertible, Bob learns Enc(M−1). Since Bob only learns
encrypted values from the protocol, he gets no information on the value of M .
A.3 Proofs
Theorem 4.3 Let Enc(M) be an encrypted n × n matrix over a finite field F, such that |F| ≥ 2n.
Then Protocol SINGULAR securely checks if M is singular with probability 1 − neg(n), communication
complexity O˜(n2k) and round complexity polylog(n), where k = log |F|. Proof: We first prove that
if det(M) 6= 0 then the output of the protocol is Enc(1). If in any iteration ma′(0) = 0, this means that
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the constant coefficient of ma′ is 0, thus x|ma′ . By Claim 3.1, ma′ |fM , where fM is the characteristic
polynomial of the matrix M . Hence, the constant coefficient of fM is 0, which implies det(M) = 0. Hence
if M is non-singular, the output of the entire protocol must be Enc(1).
On the other hand, if det(M) = 0 then, by part (i) of Claim 4.1, if the following two events happen, the
output of an iteration is Enc(0): (i) The system Mx = v is not solvable. (ii) ma′ = ma. The probability of
event (i) is at least (1− 1/|F|) ≥ 1− 1/2n > 1/2. The probability of event (ii), by Lemma 4.2, is at least
1− deg(ma)/|F| > 1− n/2n = 1/2. Therefore, with probability at least 1/4 the output of the iteration is
Enc(0). Hence the probability that det(M) = 0 and still in all the ω(log n) iterations the output is Enc(1)
is neg(n).
We account the communication and round complexity in each iteration of the protocol as follows: in
the first step we have 2 log n sequential executions of the matrix multiplication protocol, where each single
execution requires O(n2) communication and constant round. The complexity of the second step is, as
discussed above, O˜(nk) of communication and constant rounds. According to Table 1, the equality proto-
col in the third step needs O(k) communication and constant rounds. Computing the logical AND of the
ω(log n) iteration results can be done in 2 rounds and communication which does not effect the asymp-
totic complexity of the protocol. Hence, after ω(log n) repetitions we get a communication complexity of
O˜(log n(n2 + nk) = O˜(n2k) and a round complexity of ω(log2(n)) = polylog(n), as required.
Security of the protocol follows by security of the sub-protocols used. We stress that even though Bob
knows the vectors u and v in the clear this does not violate privacy of the protocol since the vectors are
random vectors and therefore could easily be simulated in a formal proof. However, an implementation of
the protocol within the same complexity and using encrypted vectors is also possible. 2
Claim 5.2 Protocol RANK≥ securely computes whether rank(M) ≥ ` with probability 1 − neg(n),
communication complexity O˜(n2k) and round complexity polylog(n).
Proof: Suppose rank(M) ≥ `. Then, by Claim 5.1, in each iteration the matrix M ′` is non-singular with
constant probability. As Protocol SINGULAR is correct with probability 1 − neg(n), we get that in each
iteration, with constant probability, the output of SINGULAR is Enc(1). Hence the probability that in any
of the iterations the output of SINGULAR is 1− neg(n).
On the other hand, if rank(M) < `, the the matrix M ′` is singular in all rounds. Therefore, in each
iteration the output of SINGULAR is Enc(0) with probability 1 − neg(n). Therefore, the probability that
in any round the output of SINGULAR is Enc(0) is neg(n). Hence the output of the protocol is correct
with the desired probability. The bounds on the round and communication complexity follow from the
complexity bounds of the Protocol SINGULAR (See Theorem 4.3). Note that computing the logical OR
of the ω(log n) iteration results can be done in 2 rounds and communication which does not effect the
asymptotic complexity of the protocol.
2
A.4 Protocols NONZERO, EQUAL and UNARY
Let x ∈ F. There clearly exist a binary circuit of size O(k) that checks for x = 0. Applying Lemma 7.1
leads to the following implementation of Protocol NONZERO.
Lemma A.1 Suppose Bobs holds an encrypted field element Enc(x). There exists a secure two-party pro-
tocol that runs in constant rounds and O(k) communication complexity that returns to Bob Enc(1) if x 6= 0
and Enc(0) if x = 0.
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Let 0 ≤ r, i ≤ n be two integers. There exist a binary circuit of size O(log n) that checks for r ≥ i.
Applying this circuit n times in parallel we get an implementation of Protocol UNARY.
Lemma A.2 Suppose Bobs holds encrypted Encbin(r) with 0 ≤ r 6= n. There exists a secure two-party
protocol that runs in constant rounds and O(n log n+kn) = O(kn) communication complexity that returns
to Bob a vector δ ∈ Fn such that δi = 1 if r ≥ i and δi = 0 otherwise.
We remark that by the techniques from [9] it is further possible to implement the two protocols EQUAL
and UNARY (without having to rely on Yao’s general method) in constant rounds and communication
complexity O˜(k) and O˜(kn), respectively.
The protocol for EQUAL is also easy to implement. Let 0 ≤, x, y ≤ n. Designing a circuit of size
O(log n) for this problem is straightforward.
Lemma A.3 Suppose Bobs holds encrypted Encbin(x),Encbin(y) with 0 ≤ x, y 6= n. There exists a secure
two-party protocol that runs in constant rounds and O(log n + k log n) = O(k + log n) communication
complexity that returns to Bob Enc(1) if x = y and Enc(0) otherwise.
B Applications
B.1 Linear Subspace Intersection
Let F be a finite field and n be a positive integer. Alice holds a subspace VA ⊆ Fn of dimension na ≤ n.
The subspace VA is represented by an na × n matrix A, where the rows of A span VA. Similarly, Bob’s
input is a subspace VB⊆Fn of dimension nb, represented by an nb × n matrix B. Letting VI = VA ∩ VB ,
Alice and Bob wish to securely study different properties of VI .
In [19], constant round O(n2) protocols were designed for securely computing the subspace VI , and
for securely computing the rank of the subspace VI . However, it turned out that the problem of securely
deciding whether the subspace VI is the trivial zero subspace seems harder to solve. Ignoring security
issues, computing the intersection of the input subspaces is at least as hard as deciding whether they have a
non trivial intersection. However, constructing a secure protocol for the latter turns to be somewhat harder
as the players gain less information from its output.
The following claim from [19] reduces the problem of deciding subspace intersection, to computing
whether a matrix is of full rank:
Claim B.1 ([19]) Define M = AB>. Then VI 6= {0} if and only if the matrix M is not full rank.
This gives rise to the following protocol:
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Protocol INTERSECTION DECIDE
Input: Alice (resp. Bob) holds a na×n (resp. nb×n) matrixA (resp. B) over a finite fieldF representing
a subspace VA⊆Fn (resp. VB⊆Fn). Let B> be a n× n′b matrix that represents the subspace V >B .
Output: If VI is the trivial zero subspace, Alice outputs 1. Else, Alice outputs 0.
1. Alice generates keys for a homomorphic public key encryption system, and sends Bob Enc(A)
and the public key.
2. Bob locally computes Enc(M), where M def= AB⊥. Note that M is a na × n′b matrix.
3. Alice and Bob execute Protocol RANK on Enc(M). Denote by Enc(r) the output of the protocol
held by Bob.
4. Alice and Bob execute protocol EQUAL on minna, n′b and Enc(r). Bob sends the encrypted
output to Alice who decrypts and outputs it.
This protocol has the same communication complexity as of the protocol designed in [19], that is O˜(n2).
However, the round complexity of this protocol, which is polylog(n) is substantially better7 then the round
complexity of [19], which is Ω(n0.275). We note that the techniques in our paper are very different from
those of [19].
B.2 Solving a Common Linear Equation System
Let F be a finite field and n be a positive integer. Alice holds an na × n matrix MA and a vector va ∈ Fna .
Similarly, Bob’s input is an na × n matrix MB and a vector vb ∈ Fnb . Alice and Bob wish to securely
compute a random vector x ∈ Fn such that both MAx = va and MBx = vb.
This problem can be viewed as computing a random vector from the intersection of the affine subspaces
representing the solutions to the systems MAx = va and MBx = vb. This problem was considered in [19],
who designed a protocol of communication complexity O˜(n2) and round complexity Ω(n0.275). We show a
protocol which improves the round complexity to polylog(n) while keeping the communication complexity
O˜(n2).
The protocol is simple: Alice generates keys for a homomorphic public key encryption system, and
sends Bob Enc(MA), Enc(va) and the public key. Bob encrypts his input to get the encrypted linear system.(
Enc(MA)
Enc(MB)
)
x =
(
Enc(va)
Enc(vb)
)
Alice and Bob then execute Protocol LINEAR SOLVE after which Bob holds Enc(x) where x is a random
solution to the common system. Finally, bob sends Enc(x) to Alice, which decrypts and outputs x.
B.3 Computing the Determinant of a Shared Matrix
Alice, holding MA ∈ Fn×n, and Bob, holding MB ∈ Fn×n, share a matrix M =MA +MB . They wish to
compute the determinant of M without leaking any other information of M . Again, we give a polylog(n)
round and O˜(n2) communication protocol for this problem, improving on previous results. The protocol is
again simple and is similar to protocolMATRIX INVERT: Alice generates keys for a homomorphic public
7we note that the polylog(n) factor in the round complexity of our protocol appears in the protocol of [19] as well. Hence our
protocol is more round efficient for small values of n as well.
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key encryption system, and sends Bob Enc(MA) and the public key. Bob encrypts his input and computes
Enc(M) = Enc(MA) + Enc(MB). Alice and Bob first execute protocol SINGULAR on Enc(M) and
let Enc(b) be the result of the protocol. Bob sends Enc(b) to Alice, who decrypts to get b. If b = 0,
Alice outputs 0. Otherwise, Bob picks a random non-singular n× n matrix R, locally computes and sends
Alice Enc(MR). Alice decrypts and compute `det(MR) and sends Bob Enc(`). Bob multiplies Enc(`) by
det(R)−1 to get Enc(det(M)), and sends it to Alice, who decrypts and outputs the result.
C Computing the minimal polynomial using the GCD algorithm
In this section we demonstrate an algorithm from [10] how to efficiently compute the minimal polynomial of
a sequence a = (ai)i∈N of recursion order n using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on polynomials. By
the definition from Section 3 the minimal polynomial ma of the sequence a is the unique monic polynomial
ma(x) = m(x) of least degree ≤ n for which m(x) • a = 0. By division with remainder we can rewrite
this as
ma · (a1 + a2x+ . . .+ a2nx2n−1)− q(x) · x2n = r(x), (1)
where r(x) is a remainder polynomial of degree < n, and q(x) is a quotient polynomial. Denote by a(x) the
sum
∑2n
i=1 aix
i−1
. If we apply the extended GCD algorithm to the two polynomials a(x) and x2n, keeping
track of remainders, we get two sequences pi(x), qi(x) such that the ri := pi(x) · a(x) − qi(x) · x2n form
a series of polynomials whose degree is strictly decreasing. As soon as the degree of ri is less than n, we
have the required polynomials from (1) with ma(x) = pi(x), q(x) = qi, and r(x) = ri(x).
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